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Outcomes have been shown to distort feeling states, performance evaluations, and 
subsequent performances. This retrospective distortion represents an outcome bias, a 
phenomenon that has been studied extensively in a wide array of disciplines and domains. 
However, despite their importance, the effects of outcomes have received little attention 
in the sport corpus. In an attempt to remedy this oversight, 60 participants with basketball 
experience were recruited to take part in a free throw shooting competition. Participants 
completed two rounds of 20 free throws. Following their first round, participants were 
randomly assigned to either a negative outcome (lose by one shot) or a positive outcome 
(win by one shot). Subsequently, participants were asked to reflect on their first round 
performance and to respond to a modified version of the CSAI-2 and a performance 
evaluation item. It was hypothesized that the positive outcome group would rate their 
performance as better, report lower levels of cognitive anxiety and higher levels of self-
confidence, and improve their score in a subsequent shooting trial. In the main, a series of 
t-tests revealed that these hypotheses were not supported. However, a Cohen’s d test 
revealed a medium effect of cognitive anxiety in the hypothesized direction. Further, a 
Cohen’s d test found that assigned outcome had a medium effect on future performance. 
Males who received a positive outcome following their round 1 performance in turn 
performed stronger in round 2 and vice versa. In addition, several correlations and means 
bear mention. These results are suggestive of an outcome bias. In light of these findings, 
implications for practitioners and other sport professionals are offered and lines of future 
research are recommended.  







Are There Bad Wins and Good Losses? Outcome Effects in Sport 
 
Have you ever stood 3 feet away from writing your name in the history books? 
Take a step into the cleats of quarterback Russell Wilson and his Seahawk teammates as 
Russell hovered above center, Max Unger, and surveyed the field inches away from the 
goal line and glory. The Seattle Seahawks are entrenched in a battle with the New 
England Patriots in football’s biggest game, the Super Bowl. One yard and 26 seconds is 
all that stands between Seattle and back-to-back Super Bowl titles.  
What transpired in the succeeding seconds will forever be one of the most 
discussed plays in football. In lieu of handing the ball off to Marshawn Lynch, who is 
well known for his truculent running style, Seattle opted to throw. Russell dropped back 
and slung the ball to wide receiver Ricardo Lockette at the goal line, but Ricardo never 
received the delivery. Instead, Malcolm Butler, a cornerback for the Patriots, intercepted 
the ball thereby ending the game and forever cementing himself in football lore. Just like 
that, all of the air left the ball for the Seahawks. Their ignominious fate that day is now 
the stuff of sport legend, and in the days following the Super Bowl many chided the final 
play call. So great was the disdain for this decision that Emmitt Smith, the revered former 
running back for the Dallas Cowboys, likened it to the worst play call ever (Puckett, 
2015).  Emmitt was not alone in his sentiment. In fact, it wasn’t just outside observers 
who were left scratching their heads. Even some Seahawk players were nonplussed by 
the decision. Linebacker Bruce Irvin, still struggling to come to terms with the result, 
wondered aloud, “We had it. I don’t understand how you don’t give it to the best back in 






Despite the excoriating language, statistics show that the final play call was not as 
straightforward as some believed it to be. Consider that prior to the Seahawks’ final play 
there were 334 examples of plays run from the one-yard line during the 2014-2015 NFL 
season (Blunt, 2015; Caplan & Igel, 2015; Morris, 2015). In 219 (65.6%) of these 
examples teams elected to run the ball, while in 115 (34.4%) teams elected to pass the 
ball. All told, 70 throws (60.9%) from the one-yard line resulted in touchdowns, while 
125 runs (57.1%) resulted in touchdowns yielding a slight edge to passes percentagewise. 
Moreover, 23 of these run plays (10.5%) resulted in a loss of yards. Still more damning is 
the fact that twice that year run plays from the one-yard line resulted in catastrophic 
failure (i.e., a fumble recovered by the opponent), while no interceptions were thrown. To 
be sure, the debate as to whether or not the Seahawks should have run the ball is not 
without merit, but the notion that it was the worst play call ever should be considered 
risible. So, what then was the cause for all the vitriol thrown the Seahawks way? 
“Winning isn’t everything, it’s the only thing” (Overman, 1999, p. 77). This quote 
from the venerated former NFL football coach, Vince Lombardi, highlights the 
importance placed on winning (i.e., outcome) in sport. When Russell Wilson threw that 
fabled interception, soiling the Seahawks chances at joining a rare class of back-to-back 
champions, all that seemed important to the pundits was the fact that the Seahawks lost 
the game. Indeed, often in sport the outcome-performance relationship is portrayed 
apodictically. That is, a good result necessarily follows a good performance. However, 
this is not always the case, and there is good reason to question the putative strength of 
this relationship. Accordingly, when emphasis on the outcome is too strong, performance 






poor performance (Lefgren, Platt, & Price, 2013; Plessner & Haar, 2006) and vice versa. 
This phenomenon represents an outcome bias (Hershey & Baron, 1988) or outcome 
effects (these terms will be used interchangeably throughout this article), where undue 
weight is set to results when evaluating performance. Outcome bias nearly resembles 
hindsight bias (Roese & Vohs, 2012), but is demonstrably unique in that remembrances 
of the past do not necessarily favor the actor. Thus, harkening back to the foregoing 
anecdote, when individuals (even experts) evaluate the Seahawks’ final play call, and 
Seattle’s performance on a whole, evaluators’ perceptions are vitiated by the play’s 
hapless outcome. 
Inherit to all competition, a certain degree of luck accompanies any given sporting 
event. This means that an athlete, coach, or team can perform optimally and not be 
successful (i.e., win) and vice versa. In such a scenario, it is imperative that the optimal 
performance be the focal point, not the outcome, to increase the likelihood of future 
success (Lefgren, Platt, & Price, 2013). If outcomes are championed in spite of 
performance, athletes and coaches may set themselves up for failure in subsequent 
competition. Therefore, it is incumbent upon performance evaluators to be wary of the 
potential deleterious effects of an outcome bias. Despite the fact that outcome effects 
have been studied extensively in fields and domains such as judgment and decision-
making (Baron & Hershey, 1988), medicine (Sacchi & Cherrubini, 2004), accounting 
(Mertins, Salbador, & Long, 2013), ethical reasoning (Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009), 
military strategy (Lipschitz, 1989), and criminal justice (Mazzocco, Alicke, & Davis, 






Therefore, the purpose of this study is to determine whether outcomes play an elemental 
role in performance judgments and future performance in sport and, if so, to what extent. 
 Statement of purpose. The goals of this review and research are as follows: first, 
the need in sport for understanding how outcomes affect performance evaluations is 
highlighted. Next, previous research on outcome effects both in and outside sport will be 
explored. Specifically, the potential for outcomes to obscure evaluations of performance, 
distort reflections of perceived cognitive anxiety and self-confidence, and in turn tamper 
with future performance, will be evaluated. Subsequently, a procedure for testing the 
effects of outcomes in sport (i.e., basketball) is outlined. Next, a description of the 
participants and the measures used in this experiment is provided, followed by an 
analysis of the results. In addition to the main hypotheses (introduced later), a series of 
correlations (e.g., self-confidence and performance), potential gender differences, and the 
possibility of skill level effects are also investigated. Finally, a discussion of the results as 
they relate to the hypotheses, the potential significance of these findings, and limitations 
are all explored in detail.  
The Need for More Objective Measures of Performance 
	
Recently, there has been a push to find more objective measures of performance 
in sport (Drust, 2010). Coaches, athletes, and sport scientists all consider performance 
analysis to be integral to their success. Advances in computer and video technology, such 
as multicamera tracking systems, have afforded performance analysts with the ability to 
quantify performance variables and provide coaches and athletes with a complex measure 
of achievement. For instance, a notational analyst (NA) who is evaluating the 






passes, and passing accuracy. In a similar vein, for tennis, a NA may wish to focus on 
quantifying winners-to-errors ratios, shots/rallies, and quality serves and returns. Despite 
statistical analyses providing coaches and athletes with sought-after breadth, qualitative 
analyses of performance are far from obsolete (Nelson & Groom, 2012). Indeed, coaches 
and athletes often engage in discussions about performance sans the help of numbers. If 
qualitative evaluations of performance are still central to the athletic endeavor, analysts 
must be wary of potential biases in their evaluations. Therefore, one goal of the current 
study is to further understand how outcomes retrospectively distort perceptions of 
performance. Such knowledge will allow coaches, athletes, and other interested parties to 
take a more objective approach to their assessments.  
Review of Literature 
	
Outcome Effects Outside of Sport 
	
Outcome bias and public opinion. Research in several domains has explored the 
effects of outcome on perceptions of decision-making and performance. Specifically, in 
the study of judgment and decision-making, outcomes have been reviewed for nearly 
seventy-five years (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). Fischoff (1975) observed that 
knowledge of outcomes increased judgments of the perceived likelihood of an event 
occurring. Subjects were presented with an arcane historical event (e.g., the British-
Gurka struggle in India in the early 1800s) and asked to judge the likelihood of four 
potential results. Individuals were randomly assigned to either a before-outcome or after-
outcome group. In the after-outcome group, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the four results (e.g., the British won) and were told that this was the actual result of 






possible results occurring—those in the after-outcome group were asked to disregard 
their assigned result. Nonetheless, participants in the after-outcome group rated their 
provided result, on average, as 10.8% more likely than the before-outcome group. 
Furthermore, individuals in the after-outcome group were more likely to rate their result 
as inevitable (subjects in the before-outcome group did not rate any of the possible results 
as inevitable) and the other results as impossible. Evidently, the result of an event looms 
heavy and it is difficult to disregard its saliency. Thus, it is challenging to paint a valid 
picture of an event as it developed when outcomes are known.  
Additionally, Baron and Hershey (1988) witnessed an outcome bias when 
individuals rated decisions made in a fictional medical matter. Participants were 
presented with a case where a 55-year old man had a heart condition and a decision had 
to be made on whether or not to operate. Raters were informed that the operation resulted 
in death in 8% of surgeries. Researchers manipulated both the decision maker (i.e., a 
physician or the patient) and the result of the procedure (i.e., success or failure). Graders 
exhibited an outcome bias by rating the decision to operate with successful outcomes 
(i.e., the patient lives) as better than those with unsuccessful outcomes (i.e., the patient 
dies) despite the fact that the odds of failure were the same for both groups (8%). This 
result illustrates that the judgers misconstrued the outcome as informative to judgments 
of the decision-making process. Moreover, when the outcomes were positive, the 
decision-makers were rated as better thinkers and more competent by a third-party 
reviewer.  
Similarly, outcome effects were seen in a study that assessed the perceived 






2004). Participants were asked to judge how blameworthy and negligent the homeowner 
was in an attack on a perceived intruder (i.e., armed robber, homeowner’s daughter’s 
boyfriend, or no indication) as well as how long the homeowner should be sentenced to 
prison. When the intruder was only injured, the blame results were significantly varied 
depending on the weapon of choice (i.e., gun or bat). However, when the intruder was 
killed as a result of the attack, no significant differences were observed based on the 
weapon of choice.  
The afore examples all deal with hypotheticals, but Fischoff and Beyth (1975) 
demonstrated the real world applicability of an outcome bias when they asked a group of 
university students to predict the probabilities of certain outcomes for a planned event. 
Participants judged the likelihood of certain outcomes (e.g., President Nixon will meet 
Mao at least once) for President Nixon’s upcoming trip to Peking and Moscow. The 
unwitting students were then asked to recall their original probabilities a few weeks after 
the trip was complete. The group exhibited an outcome bias by offering greater 
probabilities for the events they felt had occurred and lower probabilities for the ones 
they believed had not occurred. The preceding research illustrates that outcomes can bias 
performance evaluations; however, in none of these studies were the participants 
intimately familiar with the subject matter at hand.  
Experts and performance evaluations. Lipschitz (1989) surveyed the opinions 
of a group of cadets at an Israeli military school on a contrived military matter. Cadets 
were provided with a passage that detailed a wartime scenario wherein a soldier had to 
decide whether to follow protocol (i.e., appropriate action) or disobey (i.e., inappropriate 






following the soldier’s decision to go with or against protocol. Hence, the cadets were 
assigned to one of four potential groups (appropriate-successful, appropriate-
unsuccessful, inappropriate-successful, inappropriate-unsuccessful). On the whole, 
following a successful mission, cadets rated the hypothetical soldiers decision as the 
product of more scrupulous evaluation of the consequences as well as more appropriate. 
Further, soldiers who found success were rated as more active than passive, more 
decisive, more deliberate, more justified in their response, more responsible for the result, 
and as having more initiative. Thus, even those dealing with a topic they are learned in 
can be biased as a consequence of outcomes.             
Disconcertingly, outcome effects likely play a role in performance evaluations in 
the work place (Marshall & Mowen, 1993). A group of marketing students rated the 
performance of a hypothetical salesman as stronger following a successful sale (i.e., a 
positive outcome). Students exhibited an outcome bias by offering strong evaluations 
even when the method used by the salesman was considered dodgy and the eventual sale 
fortuitous. This is unsettling because it suggests that performance evaluations may simply 
be a reflection of sales performance, rather than a review of genuine performance. Taken 
together, these results further suggest that outcomes have an effect on the evaluations of 
others’ performance, but what about evaluations of one’s own performance? 
Personal performance evaluations. Personal perceptions of judgments have 
shown to be retrospectively distorted by the knowledge of outcomes. For instance, Jones, 
Yurak, and Finsch (1997) found that perceptions of judgment were biased when a group 
of participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which they had to choose 






manipulated outcome (i.e., correct selection, wrong selection, or no outcome) and then 
asked to grade their decision-making process. When asked to rate how confident they 
were in their choice, participants who chose correctly rated their performance 
significantly better than both those in the no-outcome group and individuals who selected 
the wrong applicant. Furthermore, when they were asked to rate the quality of their 
decision-making process, those who chose correctly again rated their decision-making 
more favorably than the negative outcome group (there was no significant difference 
between the no outcome group and the positive outcome group).  
Likewise, Sacchi and Cherrubini (2004) examined outcome effects among 
doctors. A group of Italian physicians were presented with a mock clinical case that 
entailed 8 distinguishable symptoms. Unbeknownst to the physicians, 4 of the symptoms 
were related to Lewy body syndrome and 4 were related to alcohol withdrawal. The 
physicians were asked to provide a diagnosis (either Lewy body syndrome or alcohol 
withdrawal) and, despite there being no correct diagnosis, were then randomly assigned 
to either a good-outcome (i.e., correct diagnosis), no outcome, or bad-outcome group 
(i.e., incorrect diagnosis). Those in the positive-outcome group rated their decision-
making process as significantly better than those in the other two groups. Furthermore, 
the positive-outcome group rated their decision-making process as far less difficult than 
the bad-outcome group (there was no significant difference between the no outcome 
group and positive-outcome group). These results elucidate that knowledge of a 
consequence can warp our opinions of personal decisions. 
Outcomes and future performance. Outcomes also have the power to affect 






2005). Erev and Roth (1998) noted results analogous to the aforementioned studies in an 
analysis of gaming strategy. They found that positive outcomes had significant predictive 
power of future performance. That is, when the results were positive, individuals were 
likely to implement that same strategy in subsequent trials of the gaming task. This 
implies that positive outcomes are seen as representative of optimal performance, and 
therefore, reinforce behavior. 
In addition, Denes-Raj and Epstein (1994) found that poor outcomes lead to 
switching strategies. Participants in a decision-making task were presented with the 
chance to win a prize if they selected the winning color from two trays of jellybeans 
(Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). One tray had a greater proportion of winning jellybeans 
(10% compared to 7%) and therefore should have been selected on each trial. However, 
despite the fact that one tray yielded a greater chance of success, 80% of participants 
selected a jellybean from both trays. When the optimal tray did not yield a winning 
jellybean, participants were swayed to select from the other, less plentiful tray (i.e., 
performance was affected).  
Ratner and Herbst (2005) found that these results generalized to a hypothetical 
investment task. In this study, participants were asked to select between broker A, who 
had a 54% chance of making a successful investment, and broker B, who had a 43% 
chance of making a successful investment (Ratner & Herbst, 2005). Initially, all 
participants selected broker A. If participants learned that broker A was successful, 98% 
of them stayed with broker A in a subsequent trial. However, if they learned that the 
broker was not successful, only 77% of participants stuck with broker A. Interestingly, 






mitigated, revealing the robustness of this phenomenon (Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen, 
1986; Ratner & Herbst, 2004). These results signal that an outcome can lead us to 
perform in a suboptimal fashion in future trials of an event. 
Outcome Effects in Sport 
	
A dearth of research exists exploring outcomes (e.g., wining and losing) and their 
affect on performance evaluations and future performance in sport. Despite the scant 
studies that exist, a few provide relevant implications. For instance, Plessner and Haar 
(2006) found that the knowledge of results could affect evaluations of sport performance. 
When a group of novice and expert judgers were asked to grade the performance of a 
soccer team after viewing a clip of said team’s game, the judgers’ perceptions were 
skewed by a manipulated outcome (i.e., the team won or the team lost). Both the novice 
and expert evaluators who were told that the team won rated their performance better 
than the evaluators who were told that the team lost. Ostensibly, it makes sense that 
outcomes would heavily skew novice’s judgments because they lack experience with the 
sport. However, even expert judgers were not immune to an outcome bias. Indeed, 
Plessner and Haar (2006) found that expert evaluators were more susceptible to a bias 
than non-experts. That is, there was a greater discrepancy between the performance 
ratings of the experts in the winning group and the losing group than the discrepancy 
among novice performance ratings.  
Arkes et al. (1986) observed corresponding results in a group of moderately and 
highly knowledgeable baseball fans. When participants were asked to predict who won 
the Most Valuable Player (MVP) award from 1940-1961 based on 7 statistics (e.g., 






significantly fewer correct responses despite being more confident in their responses. 
Thus, experts are arguably at a greater risk for an outcome bias. 
Outcome bias has been recognized on the playing field as well. Three economists 
(Lefgren et al., 2011) explored the effects of outcomes on coaches and their strategy (i.e., 
the plays they run) in 5,661 NFL games over 25 seasons (1985-2009). Their results 
demonstrated that coaches become complacent (i.e., do not change strategy) following 
wins and alter strategy excessively following losses. Strategy was measured by a team’s 
pass-to-run ratio, and on average NFL teams threw the ball 53.7% (SD = 11.6%) of the 
time over this period. On the whole, passing plays lead to 2.6 more yards than running 
plays, but a pass is still seen as riskier than a run because the quarterback may throw an 
incomplete pass and gain no yards, get sacked and lose yards or, worse, throw an 
interception. Consequently, pass frequency was abated following losses, but maintained 
following wins. Said another way, coaches were more likely to throw the ball more in 
games succeeding wins than they were in games succeeding losses. Curiously, Lefgren et 
al. (2011) found that the magnitude of a loss had no impact on the extent to which 
strategy was manipulated. That is, a coach that lost by 20 altered their strategy to the 
same extent as a coach that lost by two.  
Analogous results were seen in a 19-year (1991-2010), 46,550 game review of 
NBA coaching decisions. Following losses, coaches were more likely to adjust their 
strategy. Ostensibly, these coaches felt that a loss was a rebuke of their initial stratagem. 
In response, they tended to alter their starting lineup in a subsequent game. Coaches who 
won, however, were inclined to stay with their starting lineup. Both in the NBA and in 






the loss despite the fact that close results have no predictive utility for future 
performance. Further, expected performance did not factor into the equation. For 
instance, even when a team was projected to lose yet they beat the point spread (i.e., 
expected magnitude of loss) and outperformed expectations, coaches still responded with 
change. 
Remarkably, Berger and Pope (2011) found that professional and collegiate 
basketball teams that were slightly behind at halftime were more likely to win the game 
than would be expected. In fact, teams that were down by one at halftime were more 
likely to win the game. Thus, the argument could be made that losing is sometimes 
valuable and a boon for performance. Interestingly, Arkes et al. (1986) found that 
financial incentives exacerbated outcome effects in a decision-making task. It may be that 
professional (i.e., paid) coaches and athletes are at a greater risk for outcome effects and 
Lefgren et al. (2011, 2014) make explicit note of this distinct possibility. Furthermore, for 
management, fans, and the media, which often play an integral role in the employment of 
professional coaches, outcomes may render performance evaluations obtuse. This is a 
troubling notion for coaches whose jobs are, arguably unfairly, directly dependent upon 
results (Lefgren & Platt, 2010). 
Self-confidence and Cognitive Anxiety in Sport 
	
Ratner and Herbst (2005) illustrated how negative emotional responses to 
outcomes can lead individuals to stray from optimal decision-making in a hypothetical 
investment example. In sport, two affects that are related to success and that may be 






Hardy, 2003). Speaking to the importance of confidence, a pentathlete offered this insight 
regarding self-confidence and fencing: 
 
When you’re confident on the piste you get your distances much better . . . When 
you’re not confident in what you’re doing you tend to be more timid in your 
movement and the thing with fencing is, once you go for a move you’ve just got 
to go for it (Hays, Thomas, Maynard, & Bawden, 2009, p. 99). 
 
 A meta-analysis of 48 studies revealed that both self-confidence (r = .24) and 
cognitive anxiety (r = -.10) were related to performance (Woodman & Hardy, 2003). 
Furthermore, the relationship was greater for higher-standard athletes (e.g., elite athletes) 
than lower-standard athletes. One potential reason for this phenomenon is that high-
standard athletes are under greater pressure and stress than their low-standard peers. 
Further, Jones, Hanton, and Swain (1994) found that elite athletes (specifically 
swimmers) exhibited more self-confidence than non-elite athletes.  
Despite the results of the aforesaid meta-analysis, there is no consensus yet 
among sport researchers, as these relationships (i.e., performance and self-confidence, 
cognitive anxiety) have tallied directional discrepancies. For instance, mirroring the 
results of the meta-analysis, Martin and Gill (1991) reported that self-confidence (r = .57) 
was a significant predictor of performance in a group of high school middle and long 
distance runners, but that cognitive anxiety (r = -.10) was not. Conversely, Edwards and 
Hardy (1996) found the inverse in a group of elite female netball players where self-






related to performance. Likewise, Taylor (1987) found that cognitive anxiety positively 
predicted performance in university athletes in five different sports. Contrarily, Jones, 
Swain, and Hardy (1993) found that self-confidence ratings predicted future success in a 
group of teenage gymnasts, but that cognitive anxiety did not. These are not the only 
discrepant findings in the corpus of sport research. Indeed, Woodman and Hardy (2003) 
promulgated dozens of studies that offered disparate findings in a wide range of sports 
(e.g., swimming, pistol shooting, basketball, and artistic gymnastics).  
In addition, gender may play a significant role in these relationships. Consider 
that in Woodman and Hardy’s (2003) meta-analysis, both self-confidence and cognitive 
anxiety significantly predicted performance in men while neither relationship was 
significant for women. Further, how and when feedback is provided may also be a 
principal factor for performance. Chiviacowsky and Wulf (2007, 2009) provided 
participants in a beanbag-tossing exercise with feedback following either their most 
accurate or least accurate throws. Subsequently, both groups repeated the task, and those 
who received feedback following their most accurate throws performed stronger. 
Likewise, Hutchinson, Sherman, Martinovic, and Tenenbaum (2008) found feedback 
relative to competitors to be a central predictor of future performance. Participants were 
asked to squeeze a dynamometer with 25% of their strength for as long as they possibly 
could. When participants reached exhaustion they were provided with arbitrary results 
that indicated that they performed either in the bottom 10% (i.e., low self-efficacy group) 
or top 10% (i.e., high self-efficacy group) of all participants. These farcical results were 
shown to impact performance on subsequent trials such that those in the low self-efficacy 






participants were invited to judge their performance relative to others, this phenomenon 
was even more impressive. These results align with the rationale put forth by Hanton, 
Mellalieu, and Hall (2004), who posited that athletes with lower self-confidence tend to 
recall poorer performances while the inverse is true of athletes with greater self-
confidence. If outcomes can skew perceptions of performance (e.g., Hutchinson et al., 
2008; Sacchi & Cherubini, 2004) they may have similar affects on self-perceptions of 
cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. Specifically, negative outcomes may attenuate 
perceptions of self-confidence and augment perceived cognitive anxiety. 
Literature Review Summary 
	
To recapitulate, in sport, a premium is placed on outcomes. Namely that winning 
is indicative of optimal strategy while losing is indicative of poor strategy. In response to 
poor outcomes, as witnessed in the Super Bowl anecdote, pundits have a proclivity for 
prosaic narratives replete with undue scorn and resentment over the result. This is 
particularly troublesome when you consider that results are not always in line with 
optimal strategy (Lefgren et al., 2011, 2014). Accordingly, there has been a call in sport 
research for more objective measures of performance (Drust, 2010). 
Though only a modicum of research exists exploring the effects of outcomes in 
sport, outcomes have a more studied history in other domains including judgment and 
decision-making (Baron & Hershey, 1988) and medicine (Sacchi & Cherubini, 2004). 
This literature suggests that being knowledgeable on a subject does not negate or 
attenuate any potential bias (Lipschitz, 1989; Marshall & Mowen, 1993). Further, when 
judging the performance of others, as seen in the hypothetical 55 year-old heart patient 






evaluations of performance. Likewise, when assessing our own decisions, outcomes can 
slant our evaluations as suggested by the Italian physicians and the diagnosis decision 
(Sacchi & Cherrubini, 2004). In turn, future performance may also be altered on the basis 
of outcomes. As mentioned, Ratner and Herbst (1994) found that participants made 
suboptimal investment choices in a hypothetical investment scenario when an optimal 
choice failed to yield desired results.  
More locally, an outcome bias has been found in the sport corpus. Even among 
experts, performance evaluations of a soccer team’s highlight film were retrospectively 
distorted with knowledge of the result (Plessner & Haar, 2006). That is, when evaluators 
were informed that the team being evaluated won, they offered more favorable appraisals 
of their skill than if they were told this team lost. Similarly, in a 25-year review of NFL 
play calling, Lefgren et al. (2011) found that coaches tended to, magnitude of win or loss 
notwithstanding, manipulate their schemes following losses. On the other hand, they 
tended to stay the course strategically following wins.  
Furthermore, both self-confidence and cognitive anxiety, as was the case in the 
dynamometer exercise (Hutchinson et al., 2008), may be influenced by results. In a meta-
analysis, Woodman and Hardy (2003) found that the impact of outcomes on perceptions 
of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence was significant, but only for males. In an attempt 
to deepen the understanding of the effects of outcomes in sport, the successive 
experiment, results, and discussion are offered.  
The main objective of this research is to determine if outcomes will pervert 
performance evaluations and warp perceptions of cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. 






explore potential gender differences, and evaluate the effects of skill level. An ancillary 
aim of this research and discussion is to ignite serious conversation amongst actors in 
sport about the pernicious effects of embracing a myopic focus on outcomes. Lastly, the 
current study is unique from previous research in that the effects of outcomes are tested 
empirically in a sport setting. After manipulating outcomes, performance is measured to 




Participants were 49 male students and 11 female students from James Madison 
University who self-selected participation through an online database (SONA) in order to 
meet a requirement set forth by the institution. In addition, a few participants were 
recruited through a flyer emailed to all athletes in James Madison’s club sports. As a 
prerequisite, all athletes must have competed on an organized basketball team while in 
high school (9th–12th grade). Participants represented a wide variety of skill levels. In 
total, 26 indicated recreational basketball as being their highest level of play, five 
indicated freshman basketball as their highest level of play, 13 indicated junior varsity, 
14 indicated varsity, and one indicated club basketball at the university level as being 
their highest level of play. The majority of participants (Mage = 19.5 years, SD = 1.03 
years, age range: 18-23 years) were freshmen (n = 32), followed by sophomores (n = 16), 
seniors (n = 6), juniors (n = 5), and graduate students (n = 1). Further, the bulk of 
participants were Caucasian (n = 49), followed by Asian (n = 6), then African-American 






were assured anonymity, and informed consent was obtained prior to participation. 
Participants were compensated $5 for their involvement. 
Measures 
	
 CSAI-2. A modified version of the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory–2 
(CSAI-2; Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990) was administered during the current study. 
The CSAI-2 is a 27-item questionnaire that measures self-perceived competitive state 
anxiety on three subscales: cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-confidence. An 
example of an item testing cognitive anxiety is “I am concerned about losing.”  An 
example of an item testing somatic anxiety is “I feel jittery.” An example of an item 
testing is self-confidence is “I feel secure.” Each subscale contains nine items on a four-
point Likert scale with total scores ranging from 9–36. This measure is considered highly 
reliable as indicated by Cronbach’s alpha with reliability coefficients ranging from α = 
.79, .83, α = .82, .83, and α = .87, .90, for the cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety, and self-
confidence subscale, respectively (Ostrow, 2002). The CSAI-2 has been used to examine 
competitive state anxiety in numerous sports including basketball, cycling, golf, 
swimming, track & field, and wrestling (Woodman & Hardy, 2003). Indeed, use of the 
CSAI-2 is still ubiquitous in current sport literature. Recently, the CSAI-2 was 
administered on a group of elite basketball players in order to test the influence of home 
and away games on state anxiety (Arruda et al., 2014). At the current, only cognitive 
appraisals associated with performance were of interest. Thus, for the purposes of the 
current study only the cognitive anxiety and self-confidence subscales were utilized. 
 Self-perceived performance. For the purposes of the current study an item was 






participants were asked to recall and grade their performance by responding to the 
following question: “How would you rate your performance?” This item requires 
participants to provide a self-perceived rating of performance from 1 (very bad) to 7 
(very good). This inquiry was adapted from a question used in Sacchi and Cherubini’s 
(2004) study on outcome effects in doctors. In their version, the question reads: “How 
well would you rate your performance?” For the current study, “well” was dropped 
because there were concerns that this was a leading question (Whitney & Kite, 2012). 
 Post - performance improvement. For the purposes of the current study an item 
was created to measure the participants’ self-perceptions of the need for improvement in 
their performance. Specifically, participants were asked to recall their performance and 
indicate to what degree they felt they needed to improve in a subsequent performance by 
responding to the following query: “Compared to your first performance, how do you feel 
you must perform in the second performance?” This item required participants to provide 
a self-perceived rating of need for improvement ranging from 1 (much worse) to 7 (much 
better). Ultimately, this item was dropped from analyses as several participants indicated 
confusion over the questions wording. 
 Exit survey. At the conclusion of the experiment, participants were asked to 
complete a brief exit survey. This survey was intended to determine whether the 
participants in both groups provided commensurate effort and derived similar enjoyment, 
as well as to allow participants an opportunity to provide feedback. The first item 
queried, “To what extent did you find this experiment enjoyable?” This item required 
participants to indicate their enjoyment on a scale of 1 (not at all enjoyable) to 5 (very 






This item required participants to indicate their effort on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
seriously) to 5 (very seriously). In addition, space was provided for participants to 
express in writing any comments or concerns they wished to share regarding their 
participation or the experiment itself. 
Procedure  
	
 Prior to beginning data collection, this research was reviewed and approved by 
the James Madison IRB. Participants indicated their interest by responding to a prompt 
that was emailed out by faculty members, or they registered through an online database 
(SONA) for researchers. After making an appointment, participants were emailed one 
day prior to participating to arrive to court 3A at the campus gymnasium, University 
Recreation Center (UREC). This court was separated from court 3B by a retractable 
curtain that went the length of the court. Participants selected one of six potential 45 
minute time slots between 9:00 AM-1:30 PM. In order to eschew delays, they were asked 
to arrive five minutes early to their scheduled appointment in basketball appropriate 
attire. A few prospective participants did not arrive in appropriate dress, so they were 
turned away and invited to reschedule if they desired. As they arrived, participants were 
provided with instructions through a typed script. To allay any concerns with the script, 
participants were told that the script was necessary to assure that the procedure was as 
similar as possible for all participants. The introduction by script lasted between 2-3 
minutes, and participants were instructed to hold questions until the introduction was read 
in full. 
To begin, the lead researcher verified that participants met the prerequisite 






participants were asked to provide informed consent and demographic information. As 
part of the informed consent, participants were made aware that they would be 
videotaped during their shooting performance and that their performance would be 
judged by a few basketball experts. In turn, they were assured anonymity, both in video 
and questionnaire responses, and were provided the opportunity to decline to participate 
if they were uncomfortable with these parameters. After completing the demographic 
form and offering consent, participants were briefed that they would be performing in a 
free-throw shooting competition that involved two rounds to test the effects of stress on 
performance.  
In actuality, the competition was a ruse and was intended to test the effects of 
outcomes on future performance. Accordingly, the script informed participants that 
because it would be difficult to schedule competitors at concurrent times, they would 
instead be competing against an opponent who had already completed the shooting task. 
Participants were not made aware of their illusory opponents score until after completing 
their shooting round.  As previously noted, participants were informed that they would be 
videotaped and that a performance-dependent cash incentive (up to $5) was involved. In 
the manner of Reeves, Tenenbaum, and Tidor (2007), participants were videotaped and 
provided with a cash incentive to induce stress. Further, to insure impartiality, all 
participants were awarded $5 upon the conclusion of their participation.  
Next, participants were instructed that before their first round of shots they would 
be allotted 10 practice shots to warm-up and become acclimated with the performance 
setting and the basketball. Shots were taken on a regulation size basket (10 feet high) 






circumference) from the free-throw line 15 feet away from the basket. Participants were 
encouraged to give an honest effort and, though there was no time limit, they were told 
that they should complete their shots in a timely fashion. While the participants shot, the 
researcher was contemporaneously situated by the camera which was placed on the left 
baseline in line with the backboard. In between shots, participants retrieved their own 
rebounds. During both the practice and competitive rounds the researcher called out the 
number of shots that the participants had taken after each fifth shot. Once the practice 
round was complete, the researcher asked the participants to pause and verified that they 
understood the procedure. When the participants indicated that they understood the 
instructions the lead researcher resituated next to the camera and hit record. Once the 
camera was playing, the lead researcher instructed the participants that they could begin 
shooting their first round. The participants then shot 20 free throws while the researcher 
tallied their made baskets. 
Following their first round, participants received their randomly assigned outcome 
(i.e., win or lose). This use of deception was critical and necessary to determine the 
effects of outcomes on performance evaluations and future performance. Participants 
were assigned to either the positive outcome group (i.e., won by one made basket) or the 
negative outcome group (i.e., lost by one made basket). The lead researcher asked that 
participants wait while they referred to the master list (a list of 52 invented scores ranging 
from 1-19). Prior to participating, participants were randomly assigned to an outcome 
(i.e., win or lose) on the basis of their experience in order to ensure that experience level 
was comparable for each group. However, about midway through data collection the 






averaged more made baskets following round 1. Prior to conducting data collection it was 
stipulated that, within reason, the groups should be approximately even on ability level 
(i.e., free-throws made) following round 1. Thus, it was decided that, since the group 
means were diverging, a new grouping criterion would be implemented. Henceforth 
participants were assigned to groups following their first performance based on their 
ability level (i.e., baskets made) in an attempt to even the means for made baskets in 
round 1. Despite the change in grouping benchmark, the groups remained resemblant in 
terms of experience, age, and gender (see Group Demographics). Further, because their 
outcome could not be manipulated, it was agreed that athletes who obtained a perfect 
score (20 made baskets) or who did not convert a single free throw were to be allowed to 
continue with the experiment, but their results were to be ultimately eliminated from the 
data set. In reality, no participants missed or made all 20 shots.  
After they received their arbitrary outcome the participants were asked to 
complete the CSAI-2, the self-perceived performance item, and the post-performance 
improvement item. While responding, participants were asked to reflect on their first 
round performance. Before the second round began, the lead researcher asked that the 
participants double-check to make sure that all questions had been answered. Once the 
participants verified that each item was completed, they stepped up to the free throw line 
again. Participants were told that they had been randomly assigned to a new competitor 
and that they should once more provide maximal effort. As before, the researcher hit 
record and tallied the number of shots made during the second round of competition 






Once participants concluded their second round of shooting they were asked to fill 
out a brief exit survey. When the exit survey was complete they were awarded the $5 
payout. Additionally, they were provided with a typed debrief of the study, and the lead 
researcher explicitly detailed where contact information for both their rights as a 
participant and questions about the research itself was located (i.e., on the back). Finally, 
the researcher politely asked the participants not to speak to anyone about the experiment 
and they were subsequently thanked for participating. In total, each appointment typically 
lasted between 20-25 minutes. 
Because the researcher was concerned that such a small pool of potential 
participants (i.e., basketball players in the participant pool) may discuss the procedure 
and purpose of the study with future participants, the researcher opted to delay a full 
debrief on the use of deception until a later date. Once all of the data had been collected 
and stored, the researcher made participants aware of the use of deception and its purpose 
in a follow-up debriefing through email. In this email, participants were invited to contact 
the researcher if they had any lingering questions or concerns. 
Hypotheses  
	
This study explored the relationship between outcomes and performance 
judgments. Explicitly, the study sought to determine how an outcome (e.g., winning or 
losing) would influence subsequent evaluations of self-perceived performance, self-
perceived cognitive state anxiety, and self-perceived self-confidence when participants 
were asked to recall their performance. Furthermore, this study sought to determine how 






1. As suggested by the results obtained by Sacchi and Cherrubini (2004) with 
physicians and Jones et al. (1997) with farcical scholarship applications, it was 
hypothesized that the positive outcome group would have more favorable perceptions of 
their performance when compared to the negative outcome group. 
2. Furthermore, as evidenced by Woodman and Hardy’s (2003) meta-analysis, it 
was hypothesized that the positive outcome group would experience less perceived 
cognitive state anxiety than the negative outcome group. 
3. Additionally, in accordance with the results of Jones et al. (1993) study of 
teenage gymnasts, it was hypothesized that the positive outcome group would report 
greater self-confidence than the negative outcome group. 
4. Finally, as intimated by the dynamometer results of Hutchinson et al. (2008), it 
was hypothesized that the mean difference between the scores in Round 1 and Round 2 
for the positive outcome group would be significantly different than the mean difference 
for the negative outcome group. Moreover, in round 2 the positive outcome group would 
make more free throws than they did in round 1 and the negative outcome group would 




The proposed hypotheses were explored through SPSS. To begin, the exit survey 
results, Round 1 performance, and the demographics for the participants in the negative 
outcome and positive outcome groups were compared to establish how similar these two 
groups were. The positive outcome group (n = 31, Mage = 19.4 years, SD = .84 years) was 






2 juniors and 2 seniors. Further, 11 of these participants marked recreational basketball as 
being their highest level played, while 4 listed freshmen basketball, 9 listed junior varsity, 
6 listed varsity, and 1 listed club basketball at the university level as their highest level 
achieved. For the negative outcome group (n = 29, Mage = 19.7 years, SD = 1.2 years) 
there were 23 males and 6 females. This group included 15 freshmen, 6 sophomores, 3 
juniors, 4 seniors, and 1 graduate student. Further, 15 of these participants listed 
recreational basketball as their highest level achieved, while 1 listed freshmen basketball, 
4 listed junior varsity, 6 listed varsity basketball, and 1 listed club basketball at the 
university level as their highest level achieved. The two groups did not differ in 
performance (i.e., baskets made) following the first shooting trial (t(58) =  
-.153, p = .879, 95% CI [-2.35, 2.02]; positive outcome group, M = 9.42, SD = 3.52; 
negative outcome group, M = 9.58, SD = 4.77). Further, both groups derived a similar 
amount of enjoyment from the experiment (positive outcome group, M = 4.39, SD = .67; 
negative outcome group, M = 4.38, SD = .78) and indicated that they took the task 
seriously (positive outcome group, M = 4.35, SD = .75; negative outcome group, M = 
4.59, SD = .63). As these numbers suggest, both the negative outcome and positive 
outcome groups were rather similar in makeup. 
The Effects of Outcomes 
	
To explore the four major hypotheses, a series of t-tests was conducted. It was 
hypothesized that the positive outcome group would reflect on their performance more 
favorably than the negative outcome group. Per the results of the self-perceived 
performance item, the first hypothesis was not supported (t(58) = -1.746, p = .086, 95% 






Cohen’s d test suggested that outcome had a medium effect on performance evaluation 
(see Cohen, 1988, for effect size interpretations). Contra the hypothesis, the negative 
outcome group (M = 4.14, SD = 1.51) rated their performance as stronger when compared 
to the positive outcome group (M = 3.54, SD = 1.09). In general, the negative outcome 
group rated their performance as being slightly strong, while the positive outcome group 
rated their performance as being slightly poor. This result suggests that performance 
evaluations may be related (see Cohen’s d) to assigned outcomes such that poor results 
produce stronger evaluations of performance. This finding is peculiar and it goes against 
the hypothesized findings. 
Regarding hypothesis 2, it was proposed that the positive outcome group would 
experience less perceived cognitive anxiety as detailed by the CSAI-2. However, no 
significant difference was observed between the two groups’ perceived cognitive anxiety 
scores (t(58) = 1.88, p = .066, 95% CI [.-5.23, .14]; d = .49). Though this result was not 
statistically significant, a Cohen’s d test suggested that outcome had a medium effect on 
cognitive anxiety in the hypothesized direction. In general, the positive outcome group 
(M = 17.87, SD = 4.43) experienced lower levels of cognitive anxiety compared to 
outcome group (M = 20.41, SD = 5.9) while both groups experienced low cognitive 
anxiety overall. This result suggests that perceptions of cognitive anxiety were affected 
(see Cohen’s d) by assigned outcomes such that poor results increase perceptions of 
cognitive anxiety and vice versa. This finding is notable because it is in accord with the 
original hypothesis (i.e., hypothesis 2). 
In addition, it was hypothesized that the positive outcome group would experience 






significant differences were revealed between the two groups’ self-confidence scores 
(t(58) = .771, p = .444, 95% CI [-,1.87, 4.22]; d = .2). In general, the positive outcome 
group (M = 26.96, SD = 4.73) and the negative outcome group (M = 25.79, SD = 6.93) 
experienced similar levels of self-confidence. This result suggests that on average both 
groups experienced high self-confidence when completing the shooting competition. As 
discussed later, self-confidence appraisals appeared to be more dependent on Round 1 
performance rather than the assigned outcome. 
 Finally, it was hypothesized that the mean difference scores between the shots 
made in Round 1 of the competition and Round 2 of the competition would be 
significantly different for the two groups. More specifically, it was believed that the 
positive outcome group would, on average, make more shots than they did in the first 
round and the negative outcome group would make fewer shots than they did in the first 
round. The divergence of the mean difference scores between rounds was then compared. 
However, no significant difference between the mean differences scores for the positive 
outcome group (Mdiff = .68, SD = 3.02) and the negative outcome group (Mdiff = -.28, SD 
= 3.61) was observed, t(58) = ..486, p = .642, 95% CI [-1.32, 2.12]; d = .12. These results 
suggest that round 2 (i.e., future performance) was not affected by the assigned outcome. 
This hypothesis is explored further in the post-hoc analyses. 
Post-hoc Analyses 
	
Relationship between self-confidence, cognitive anxiety, performance 
evaluations, and performance. In an attempt to better understand the findings of the 
current study, to explore post-hoc inquiries, and to examine potential moderators, the data 






group, self-confidence was positively related to performance (Round 1, r = .54, p > .001; 
Round 2, r = .39, p = .002). As is expected, this suggests that athletes felt more confident 
when they made more baskets. Conversely, negative correlations between cognitive 
anxiety and performance were observed, although the relationships were not significant 
(Round 1, r = -.2, p = .12; Round 2, r = -.17, p = .19). As such, the self-confidence and 
cognitive anxiety scores were negatively related to each other (r = -.46, p < .001). 
Further, performance ratings were positively related to actual performance (Round 1, r = 
.77, p  < .001; Round 2, r = .42, p = .001), which advises that the athletes’ performance 
evaluations were not strongly affected based on the result. Accordingly, performance in 
Round 1 and Round 2 was strongly related (r = .68, p < .001), and self-confidence scores 
were also strongly related to performance evaluations (r = .48, p < .001). 
Gender discrepancies regarding future performance. Despite the non-
significant result, the mean difference hypothesis (i.e., hypothesis 4) deserves further 
detail. When females (n = 11) and one outlier1 from the negative outcome group were 
removed from the analysis, a t-test of this abridged dataset (n = 48; positive group n = 26; 
negative group n = 22) revealed results that deserved mention (t(46) =  1.88, p = .067, 
95% CI [3.42, - 0.12]; d = .55). While the result is not statistically significant, a Cohen’s 
d test indicates that assigned outcome had a medium effect on second round performance. 
In fact, on average the positive outcome group (Round 1 M = 9.15, SD = 3.66; Round 2 
M = 10.08, SD = 3.77) made nearly one more free throw during their second round of 
competition. Conversely, on average the negative outcome group (Round 1 M = 10.41, 
SD = 4.64; Round 2 M = 9.68, SD = 4.92) made nearly one fewer free throw during their 






effect on males when it comes to future performance2. Specifically, positive results may 
lead to stronger performances in a subsequent trial and negative results may lead to 
weaker performances in a subsequent trial. Interestingly, Woodman and Hardy’s (2003) 
meta-analysis of self-confidence, cognitive anxiety, and performance found significant 
results for males, but not females. All this recommends that gender may play a 
meaningful role in the dynamic between outcomes, future performance, and feeling 
states. Additional investigation of this hypothesis can be found in the discussion section.  
 Skill level effects. Following the statistical exploration of the hypotheses and the 
sequence of correlations, it was determined that the skill level variable (denoted by the 
highest level of organized basketball achieved) deserved further attention to determine 
whether outcomes differentially affect varying levels of experience. There were five 
levels of skill: recreational (n = 26), freshman (n = 5), junior varsity (n = 13), varsity (n = 
14), and beyond varsity (n = 2).  Keeping in mind sample size concerns, there are several 
means that bear mention3. Given that only means are reported, it must be stated that no 
casual inferences can be drawn from these numbers. Nevertheless, these results are 
provided as evidence that future research should further scrutinize the relationship 
between skill level and outcome effects. This variable may have acted as a moderator 
impeding the ability to isolate an outcome bias and in turn forcing the hypotheses to not 
be supported. Because just five participants listed freshman basketball as their highest 
level achieved and only two participants listed beyond club as their highest level 
achieved, neither of these groups are included in the forthcoming discussion.  
Per their mean difference scores (see Table 1), recreational and junior varsity 






full shot. As would be expected, varsity athletes made, on average, more shots (about 2 
more shots) than junior varsity and recreational level athletes. Finally, when only males 
(n = 48) are included in the comparison, a few mean differences become more 
pronounced or entirely new relationships emerge4. For instance, recreational athletes do 
not improve in their round 2 performance, but junior varsity and varsity athletes do 
improve. These means intimate that skill levels are unique and that outcomes may 
distinctly affect different skill levels. For further detail on skill levels effects see Table 1. 
Table 1 
The Effects of Skill on Feeling States, Performance, and Performance Evaluation 
 Recreational  
(n = 26) 
Freshman    
(n = 5) 
Junior Varsity  
(n = 13) 
Varsity  
(n = 14) 
Beyond Varsity  
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 PE Total 
 
3.8 (1.5) 4.2 (1.1) 3.5 (1.2) 4 (1.4) 4 (0) 

























 Round 1      
Total 
 
8.6 (4.3) 9.8 (5) 9.3 (3.1) 10.8 (4.5) 13 (0) 




















 Round 2       
Total 
 
9.1 (4.3) 9 (2) 9.6 (3.9) 11.9 (3.8) 13.5 (0.7) 
MDiff Round 





















 MDiff  Total 0.5 (3.8) - 0.8 (3.1) 0.3 (2.8) 1.1 (3.2) 0.5 (0.7) 
 
Note. Cognitive anxiety (CA) and self-confidence (SC) scores are derived from the 
CSAI-2 (Martens, Vealey, & Burton, 1990); scores range from 9-36. The personal 
performance evaluation (PE) item is adapted from Sacchi and Cherubini (2003); scores 
range from 1-7. Round 1 and Round 2 means are represent made baskets (out of 20 
attempts). Total scores represent the means and standard deviations for skill level 
regardless of outcome (i.e., across groups). 
Discussion 
Summary of Results 
	
 This research examined the effects of outcomes in sport on evaluations of 
performance and feeling states. Specifically, participants took part in a free-throw 
shooting competition wherein their illusory opponent had already completed his or her 
shooting round. Following Round 1, participants were provided with a contrived result 
(i.e., won by one or lost by one made basket) to determine whether results would affect 
their evaluations of their performance, their appraisals of their self-confidence and 
cognitive anxiety, and their performance in a second round.  
Outcomes and self-perceptions of performance. It was hypothesized that the 






negative outcome group. However, the two groups did not significantly differ in this 
manner. In fact, the negative outcome group rated their performance as better, though this 
result was not statistically significant. This finding sits in stark contrast to much of the 
extant outcome literature. For example, Italian physicians rated their skill of diagnosis on 
the basis of its outcome (Sacchi & Cherubini, 2004).  
Several possible explanations exist as to why the hypothesized relationship 
between outcomes and self-perceptions of performance was not seen. First, the free-
throw shooting tournament may not have been appropriate to evoke the emotions (e.g., 
anxiety) experienced during actual competition. Greater impressions of cognitive anxiety 
have been related to performance, such that as cognitive anxiety increases performance 
tends to decrease (Woodman & Hardy, 2003). However, athletes in the current study 
experienced levels of cognitive anxiety (positive outcome group, M = 17.87, SD = 4.43; 
negative outcome, M = 20.41, SD = 5.9) that on the whole were similar to high school 
male (this research had mostly male participants) basketball players (M = 20.92, SD = 
6.11; Martens et al., 1990) prior to competition. Likewise, participants reported levels of 
self-confidence (positive outcome group, M = 26.97, SD = 4.73; negative outcome group, 
M = 25.79, SD = 6.93) that were similar to high school male basketball players (M = 
24.73, SD = 5.52) prior to competition. Furthermore, participants reported that they took 
the free-throw shooting task seriously. These findings indicate that the free-throw 
shooting competition produced feeling states tantamount to those experienced in actual 
competition.  
Alternatively, it may be that outcomes affect the athlete less than those in other 






in response to losing, wherein the athlete reacts by resolving that his or her performance 
was not that poor. This explanation appears somewhat improbable when you consider 
that performance in a dynamometer exercise was severely hampered following a poor 
outcome and vice versa (Hutchinson et al., 2008). Further, outcomes have been shown to 
influence how coaches and athletes interact with the game. For instance, NFL coaches 
tended to reshape their strategy in response to a loss or continue on with their current 
strategy following a win (Lefgren et al., 2011).  
From our view, it is most likely that these numbers represent statistical flukes and 
that further data collection would bear out that the relationship is truly either null or that 
positive outcomes improve performance evaluations and vice versa. After all, physicians 
have been shown to rate their performance based on outcomes (Sacchi & Cherubini, 
2003) and NBA coaches are more likely to manipulate their starting lineups following a 
loss (Lefgren et al., 2013). Accordingly, future research should aim to further detail the 
relationship between outcomes and performance evaluations. 
 Outcomes and self-perceptions of cognitive state anxiety and self-confidence. 
It further was hypothesized that the positive outcome group would appraise their 
cognitive state anxiety and self-confidence related to their Round 1 performance as lower 
and higher, respectively, when compared to the negative outcome group. However, the 
two groups did not differ in their cognitive state anxiety scores. This result is not entirely 
surprising. Indeed, regarding cognitive anxiety, Woodman and Hardy (2003) 
promulgated discrepant findings in their meta-analysis of the CSAI-2. For instance, in a 
group of teenage gymnasts, cognitive anxiety was negatively related to performance, 






male wrestlers cognitive anxiety was positively related to performance. The current study 
observed that cognitive anxiety was negatively related to performance (Round 1 r = -.2; 
Round 2 r = -.17), which aligns well with the correlations reported in Woodman and 
Hardy’s (2003) meta-analysis (r = -.10, r = -.22 for males). The conversation becomes 
more tenuous when you consider that some argue that anxiety can be interpreted as either 
facilitative or debilitative (Woodman & Hardy, 2003). Athletes may have high anxiety, 
but interpret this feeling state as being facilitative to performance. Accordingly, they may 
perform well under such cognitive pressure and vice versa. All this is to say that it 
remains unclear how performance interacts with anxiety. Thus, future research should 
strive to elucidate further how cognitive anxiety relates to performance and outcomes. 
 That being said, a Cohen’s d test recommends that the athletes’ perceptions of 
cognitive anxiety actually were swayed by assigned outcome to a medium effect (d = 
.49). The positive outcome group reported lower levels of cognitive anxiety when they 
reflected on their round 1 performance than did the negative outcome group. Thus, 
outcomes may have the capacity to tinker with cognitive anxiety. Furthermore, this result 
signals that other reflections on performance may be distorted as a product of outcomes 
as well. For instance, an athlete may be prone to recalling positive aspects of a 
performance following a win or other positive result while the opposite may be true for 
an athlete following a loss or a negative result. As an example, a tennis player may reason 
that he or she lost because they have a poor forehand shot when in actuality the 
performance could be chalked up to reasonable variability in forehand stroke 
performance. An even more deleterious possibility is that an athlete may take the result as 






review of faulty causal narratives) and will deny evidence to the contrary. They may 
reason that, “well I lost, so I must have a poor forehand stroke.” In doing so, an athlete 
may be unable to recognize what skills they are proficient in and what skills need to be 
honed. There are innumerable analogues in other sports and coaches, practitioners, and 
other sport actors are no less susceptible to this biased reasoning. To be sure, more 
research is needed, but if this account is corroborated by future research this finding 
would undoubtedly be of interest to coaches, athletes, and practitioners alike. 
 In addition, the results of this study revealed that the positive and negative 
outcome groups did not differ in their self-confidence scores. This suggests that self-
confidence was not depressed as a result of poor outcomes or enhanced by a positive 
outcome. Interestingly, self-confidence was strongly related to performance across both 
groups of participants. Hanton et al. (2004) posited that athletes with greater self-
confidence tend to recall stronger performances and vice versa. Thus, it makes sense that 
participants who performed more strongly in Round 1 reported having higher self-
confidence. There is not yet a consensus on how self-confidence relates to performance. 
In the current study, self-confidence was strongly related to performance (Round 1, r = 
.54; Round 2, r = .39). Woodman and Hardy (2003) also determined self-confidence was 
related to performance (r = .24) through their meta-analysis (r = .29 for males) of this 
relationship. Nonetheless, 10% of the studies they reviewed found a negative relationship 
between self-confidence and performance.  In reaction, future research should seek to 
determine if a relationship exists between outcomes and self-confidence. 
 Outcomes and subsequent performance. Finally, it was hypothesized that the 






would be significantly different. That is, the positive outcome group would convert more 
free throws from Round 1 to Round 2 and the negative outcome group would convert 
fewer free throws. Although this hypothesis was rejected, it must be noted that for males 
both of the groups mean difference scores between rounds trended in the hypothesized 
directions. More to the point, males in the positive outcome group made nearly one more 
free throw during their second round, while those in the negative outcome group made 
nearly one fewer free throw. As suggested by Cohen’s d, this performance discrepancy (d 
= .55) is indicative of a medium effect. Such an effect is undoubtedly of interest to sport 
professionals. Further, these results line up with those found in Denes-Raj and Epstein’s 
(1994) jellybean procedure where discouraging results (i.e., not picking a winning 
jellybean) led participants to endorse a suboptimal strategy in subsequent trials. Similar 
performance degradations have been observed in investment tasks (Ratner and Herbst, 
2005), gaming strategy (Erev & Roth, 1998), strength training (Hutchinson et al., 2008) 
and NFL play calling (Lefgren et al., 2011). Given that performance is such a critical 
variable in sport, it is incumbent upon the field to invest in research and statistical 
analyses that will aid in creating a better understanding of the response to outcomes of 
coaches, athletes, and teams in general. In the current, this result signals that coaches, 
athletes, and teams should be wary of outcome effects and be skeptical of the notion that 
a given outcome – win or loss, success or failure – provides valuable input when 
evaluating performance. 
 In summation, a series of t-tests provided no support for the four main 
hypotheses. However, further scrutiny of the data yielded two statistics of note. First, 






anxiety to a medium effect (d = .49). Those who received a positive outcome reported 
lower levels of cognitive anxiety during round 1. Second, regarding hypothesis 4, round 2 
(i.e., future) performance for males was also affected by assigned outcome to a medium 
effect (d = .55). Males who were provided with a positive outcome tended to perform 
better in round 2 and males who received a negative outcome tended to perform worse in 




 There are limitations to the current research that deserve discussion. Specifically, 
there are concerns about external validity, test environment, magnitude effects, and 
sample size. It must be stated that acquiring external validity is always an issue when 
studying sport (Woodman & Hardy, 2003). Undeniably, it is difficult to replicate the 
pressure and anxiety associated with competition. However, it should be noted that in an 
attempt to augment stress, the current study used cash incentives (Arkes et al., 1986) and 
videotaped the participants while they were shooting (Reeves et al., 2004). Moreover, 
participants indicated that they experienced similar levels of self-confidence and 
cognitive anxiety during the task as their peers prior to competition (Martens et al., 
1990). Nevertheless, down the road sport researchers are encouraged to construct test 
environments that mirror the athletes’ performance milieu and allow for outcome 
manipulation.  
Another concern deals with the test environment. Though the divider was down 
and the court was reserved, gym patrons could still use the court on the other side of the 






the gym and sometimes there were not. Noise pollution from the adjacent court may have 
unsettled participants while they were shooting and in turn meddled with their 
performance corrupting our results. Further, on a couple occasions the experiment was 
disrupted by patrons who wished to use the other half of the court that the participants 
were using. These interlopers were hurried away immediately and the disruption was 
deemed minimal.  Nonetheless, despite best efforts to limit these interruptions, 
participants who performed in the presence of other patrons may have performed worse 
than they otherwise would have. As such, future research would ideally take place in a 
more intimate testing environment to isolate any potential outcome effects. 
Additionally, there are concerns that the outcome manipulation (i.e., win by 1 or 
lose by 1) was not strong enough to observe the hypothesized effects. However, past 
research suggests that the magnitude of outcomes does not exacerbate the results of 
outcome effects (Lefgren et al., 2014). Furthermore, minimizing the magnitude of a loss 
or a win allowed us to retain both elite and poor performances. No doubt it is valuable to 
be able to retain and manipulate the outcome for an athlete who makes 19 free throws. 
Ostensibly, making 19 shots indicates a strong performance, but an athlete may rate their 
performance worse if they lose. As such, it was determined that a one shot magnitude 
was ideal because it permitted both possessing more participants results and studying the 
severity of outcome effects. Nevertheless, exploring the effects of outcomes in the 
presence of larger wins and losses is a worthwhile pursuit and may yield more conclusive 
results. 
 Finally, the sample size for each group (n = 29 for positive outcome group, n = 31 






= .8) to find a medium effect (d = .5) in a t-test, Cohen (1992) recommends a sample of 
64 per group. Had more participants been included, statistically significant results may 
have been obtained (see specifically hypothesis 2 on cognitive anxiety and, for males 
only, hypothesis 4 on subsequent performance). However, the number of prospective 
participants that met the prerequisite criteria of having played organized basketball in 
high school in the participant pool was limited. Indeed, even obtaining the suggested 
sample size was originally a concern. Thus, future replications of the current study, or 
future research of outcome bias in the broad, should seek to employ a more appropriate 
number of participants. 
Future Research 
	
Beyond the lines of future research implied in the afore discussion of the 
hypotheses, several other variables of import and their potential moderating effects are 
worthy of note. It is recommended that these variables and their relations to outcomes be 
explored. For instance, the current study does not appropriately address the potential 
issue of gender. The results for the current study’s small sample of females suggest that 
outcomes may not have a strong impact on performance. Moreover, the performance for 
females in the positive outcome group did not improve and the performance for females 
in the negative outcome group did not suffer. Conversely, for males, performance 
improved when they were provided with a positive outcome and decreased when they 
were provided with a negative outcome. However, the sample size (n = 11) for females 
was wanting, and gender remains a variable of interest. Thus, the interaction between sex 






Another matter that is not addressed properly in the current research is duration of 
impact. If outcome effects are fleeting, they may not be of great import to most athletes 
and coaches because in most sports the gap between competitions is several days. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that outcome effects remain prominent for an 
extended period of time. As a result, athletes and coaches who are associated with an 
outcome (e.g., a strong performance, winning a championship, or a losing season) may be 
assigned distorted performance evaluations (e.g., too much blame or too much praise) in 
subsequent competition as a product of this association. For example, a group of 
gymnastic judges were shown a tape of a gymnast who either had a perfect routine or a 
routine with an error (Ste-Marie & Valiquette, 1996). One week later, the judges were 
asked to grade another performance (both groups viewed the same routine) from the same 
gymnast. Judges who viewed the perfect routine graded the subsequent performance 
more favorably. To test whether or not outcome effects are fleeting and whether the 
aforesaid findings will generalize, future research should explore further the lasting 
duration of outcome effects. 
In addition, different sports carry with unique stressors. Thus, you may find that 
long distance runners (Martin & Gill, 1991) perform better in the presence of high self-
confidence and low cognitive anxiety while the inverse is true of netball players 
(Edwards & Hardy, 1996). Outcomes may work similarly, and they may have a greater 
impact in certain sports. On the contrary, type of sport may have little impact while 
individual differences may be more pertinent. Some athletes, regardless of sport, may 






performance and feeling states. Determining where outcome effects fall on the sport 
versus individual continuum should be parsed in future research. 
 Finally, as it relates to outcome bias, skill level has the potential to be a 
meaningful mediating factor. Indeed, the current research observed a potential impact of 
skill level. Varsity level athletes tended to exhibit greater self-confidence, made more 
baskets, rated their performance as better and improved more from Round 1 to Round 2 
than any other skill level. How might elite level athletes, where the pressure to succeed is 
exacerbated, respond to outcomes? Jones, Hanton, and Swain (1994) suggested that 
although impressions of anxiety may not shift dramatically as athletes progress through 
the ranks, feelings of self-confidence do. Namely, that as athletes begin to compete at 
more elite levels and acquire more skill their self-confidence is augmented. 
Consequently, sport researchers should move to determine to what degree skill level 
differentially works to mitigate or intensify outcome effects. 
Outcome Bias and the Belief in the Hot Hand and Clutch Players 
	
Gymnastics judges have been shown to attach certain outcomes (e.g., a routine 
with no mistakes) to gymnasts and to judge future routines on the basis of these attached 
outcomes (Ste-Marie & Valiquette, 1996). Similarly, it is not uncommon for NBA 
players to be attached to specific outcomes (e.g., making an important shot late in a 
game). These ephemeral performances inspire grand exaltation and lead the media and 
fans to respond in kind by bestowing these players with gaudy appellations. One example 
was the moniker given to the Los Angeles Lakers’ Kobe Bryant, “The Black Mamba”, an 
ode to the large, extremely aggressive and venomous snake found in sub-Saharan Africa. 






scenarios (Rovell, 2016). Another example is Vinnie “Microwave” Johnson who spent 
most of his career with the Detroit Pistons. Johnson’s apparent streak shooting ability 
inspired work (Larkey, Smith, & Kadane, 1989) that attempted to trample on research 
documenting the hot hand fallacy (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985) or the fallacious 
belief in streaks. Ultimately, the conclusions of Larkey et al. (1989) were debunked when 
it was found that the statistics that were used were invented (Tversky & Gilovich, 1989). 
Going far beyond just basketball, this fallacy has been documented in many more sports 
including golf (Clark, 2005), and baseball (Albert, 1993), among others. In fact, this 
deception is so ubiquitous that it’s also been observed in disciplines outside of sport, 
perhaps most notably in stocks and mutual fund performance (Kahneman, 2011; Sirri & 
Tufano, 1998). 
These celebrated players are in turn counted on later to perform in deciding 
moments of competition; this class of athletes is commonly said to be clutch (Solomonov, 
Avugos, & Bar-Eli, 2015). However, Solomonov et al. (2015) reveal that this perception 
of clutch players is arguably a misnomer. Players who were denoted as clutch by NBA 
experts performed no better in pressure situations than their ostensibly ordinary peers. 
Instead, they experienced typical performance degradations in high-pressure scenarios 
(Cao, Price, & Stone, 2011). Nonetheless, the belief in the hot hand and the notion of 
clutch players is pervasive and many sport professionals and some sport researchers (e.g., 
Miller & Sanjurjo, 2014) would scoff at the above research. This belief has so much sway 
that teammates and coaches tend to orient the ball to shooters with the perceived hot hand 
or to clutch players during critical moments of a game (Attali, 2013; Csapo, Avugos, 






players with the perceived hot hand get more shots and thus are provided with more 
opportunities to succeed in pressure situations. The fact that these players are often no 
more successful in these situations does not appear to bear on the minds of most sport 
professionals.  
Though the debate continues, in the least, the relationship between belief in ability 
(e.g., how clutch a player is) and actual performance is far weaker than many purport it to 
be (Moskowitz & Wertheim, 2011; Vergin, 2000). Thus, coaches and athletes should be 
wary of their perceptions of players’ abilities in crucial moments. If they are not, they 
may endorse and utilize a deficient strategy in these critical moments and settle for an 
uncommonly difficult shot when other options exist. Here, coaches and athletes fall prey 
to an outcome bias because they tend to, in lieu of the failures, recall moments of success. 
For perspective, Kobe Bryant may have made many significant baskets in his career, but 
this is a product of his taking many significant shots. He missed a great deal as well and, 
in fact, his performance in crucial situations is opposite of what his moniker suggests–he 
performs poorly (Abbott, 2011). Perhaps the Lakers would have won more games had 
they entertained other options during pivotal moments. 
Explaining Outcome Effects: The Availability Heuristic, Confirmation Bias, the 
Narrative Fallacy, and Randomness 
An obvious rejoinder to the suggestion of an outcome bias is, how did this bias 
come to be? Though this was not the immediate purpose of this review and research, a 
cursory explanation is offered now so that future research and discussion may be steered 
in the right direction. Here, three phenomena bear mention: the availability heuristic 






Simons, 1991), the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998), and the narrative fallacy 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1997; Taleb, 2007; Wilson, 2002).  
According to the availability heuristic, when considering decisions or topics, we 
do not pull all relevant information to the fore (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Instead, we 
rely on a few specific examples that are easily called to mind. In addition, Schwarz et al. 
(1991) determined that ease of recall is also an influential factor when considering 
decisions or topics. It follows that it is easier to recall two examples of an event than it is 
to recall three examples of an event and so on. The more examples we are requested to 
recall, the less confident we are in our conclusions. When left to our own devices, 
however, we tend to take an example or two and then make a judgment. In turn, we are 
prone to notice instances that align with our original judgments. That is to say that we 
succumb to a confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). Thus, a coach may recognize when a 
player who has been deemed clutch makes a basket in a crucial situation, but fail to 
acknowledge a disconfirming instance where this player misses a basket at a crucial 
moment (recall the Kobe Bryant anecdote, Abbott, 2011). In the current study, 
participants in the negative outcome group may have recalled losing (i.e., performing 
poorly) in round 1 and subsequently performed worse than they otherwise would have.  
The narrative fallacy speaks to our predilection for shaping narratives around 
facts (Taleb, 2007). It is not enough for us to know that an event occurred; in tow we 
require an explanation for said event. These explanations put us at ease even when they 
are unfounded or erroneous (Taleb, 2007; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In an extreme 
example, research subjects were asked to watch a documentary about the plight of Jewish 






main character to be) to the film (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In one condition, participants 
were subjugated to distracting noise (i.e., a power saw) directly outside of the viewing 
room. The noise condition reported that the noise had affected their reviews when in truth 
their ratings were no different than the control group. So engrained is this need for an 
explanation that these subjects mistakenly reported that their ratings had been affected.  
Further complicating this discussion, many do not have a firm grip on randomness 
and chance events (Burns & Corpus, 2004). For instance, a great deal believe that a 
random-number generator is more likely to spit out a variegated sequence of digits such 
as 4891, than a repetitive sequence such as 2222, even though both series are just as 
likely (Chapanis, 1953). Another example of our ineptitude is seen when many do not 
recognize that in a progression of 200 coin flips it is likely that you will at some point 
observe a string of 6 or 7 heads or tails in a row (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). 
Moreover, we tend to believe that truly random sequences or events do not cluster 
leading us to conclude that clusters are indicative of an observable pattern. This 
phenomenon, which has been documented in sport (Gilovich, 1984), is known as the 
clustering illusion (Gilovich, 1991). 
In the present research, participants in the negative outcome group may have 
taken their result as evidence that they were more anxious than they truly were. They may 
have reasoned that anxiety is associated with poor performances so they must have been 
anxious. All this is not fully conscious reasoning, but rather the product of a lifetime of 
reinforced rationalizing (Wilson, 2002). We do not always know why an event took 






This fallacy is of particular consequence when considering outcomes that are 
unexpected. When the actual outcome of an event is not what was expected, this does not 
necessarily suggest that our a priori expectations were invalid. Indeed, when dealing with 
complex environs as capricious as a sporting event, one must respect the potential for 
innumerable outcomes. Hence, when a team experiences an unexpected loss or an athlete 
performs worse than expected, the outcome it is not necessarily cause for concern. It may 
simply be a development in line with reasonable variability. Nevertheless, it appears that 
it is hard for us to intuit that expected outcomes and actual outcomes will not always 
align. 
Significance of the Study 
	
 In the main, the hypotheses of this research were not supported. Nonetheless, 
there are still several relevant implications for both practitioners and scholars in the field 
of sport and athletics to consider. The current study was unique from previous research in 
that outcomes were manipulated in a sport setting to determine if they would alter future 
performance. Thus, this research fills a gap in the extant literature because it is an 
empirical test of the effects of outcomes in sport. Of most interest, the current study 
observed an outcome bias in sport when male participants in the negative outcome group 
made fewer free throws (nearly one fewer) in their Round 2 performance while those in 
the positive outcome group made more free throws (nearly one more) in their Round 2 
performance. Further, as suggested by a Cohen’s d test, cognitive anxiety was affected by 
assigned outcome to a medium effect. Thus, those who were assigned a positive outcome 






Seemingly, outcomes have the ability to mangle our recollections and influence future 
performance. 
As suggested earlier, there are several lines of potential research that could 
expand our understanding of this phenomenon. For example, will males and females 
differ in regards to their response to outcomes? In the current study, future performance 
for males and females was differentially affected by assigned outcome. Furthermore, 
determining what variables (e.g., mental toughness, interpretations of stress and anxiety, 
self-efficacy) delineate between individuals who are highly and lowly affected by 
outcomes is a worthwhile pursuit of future research. For instance, Jones et al. (1994) 
found that elite athletes tended to have more facilitative interpretations of anxiety than 
their non-elite peers. It is important to note that, while the impacts of potential mediating 
variables (e.g., self-efficacy) are worthy of interest, the purpose of the current study was 
to determine simply whether or not an outcome bias exists in sport. This research 
advances that this concern is founded, as evidenced by the impact of outcomes on 
subsequent performance and perceived cognitive anxiety, thus future research should 
strive to discern what variables act to manipulate this effect. Once the impact of these 
variables is better understood and outcome effects in sport are finely detailed, researchers 
must move to determine what can be done to mollify the effects of outcomes.  
 In the interim, relevant parties should not delay action. Going far beyond just free 
throw shooting, an outcome bias has the potential to perniciously affect performance in a 
variety of ways (recall the discussion in Outcome Effects in Sport). Following the 
preponderance of evidence that has been offered, organizations, athletes, and coaches 






outcome bias. Additionally, it is counseled that those in sport be cautious with the 
narratives they shape around results. In short, every loss or poor outcome is not 
necessarily the fruit of defective strategy. Nor is every win or optimal outcome always 
the crop of choice strategy (Gilovich, 1991; Taleb, 2007; Wilson, 2002). 
Pressing forward, it is advised that practitioners broach the topic of outcome 
effects with the athletes and teams with whom they work. The outcome bias corpus 
suggests that both evaluations of personal performance (e.g., Sacchi & Cherrubini, 2008) 
and others’ performance (e.g., Hutchinson et al., 2008) are slanted as a product of results 
(e.g., we lost so we played poorly). This research demonstrated that cognitive anxiety 
might be augmented in the face of a poor result. Additionally, future performance has 
been shown to deteriorate following poor outcomes (e.g., Hutchinson et al., 2008). 
Likewise, the current study found a trend existed for male athletes who were provided 
with a positive result following a round of free throw shooting. These participants 
performed stronger in a subsequent round of free throw shooting, while athletes who 
received a negative result performed worse. This is concerning because athletes and 
coaches are not in complete control of results—a stroke of good fortune can have 
fortuitous effects on outcomes while a fluke can have pernicious effects.  
Furthermore, coaches should be wary of the potential impact of specific 
performances (i.e., an outcome bias) and in response should not overly rely on or 
discredit their athletes’ abilities in certain situations (recall the discussion in Outcome 
Bias and the Belief in the Hot Hand and Clutch Players). As an example, a coach who 
witnesses a player performing poorly in a crucial situation should not unquestionably 






to an average performance (e.g., shooting percentage) and determine if the approach and 
the athlete’s response was fitting. This advice holds firm for all relevant actors (e.g., 
athletes, practitioners, fans) in the sport domain. Likewise, coaches can be 
inappropriately associated with outcomes. For instance, a coach who outperforms 
expectations (i.e., beats the spread), but still incurs a bad result, may not be appropriately 
commended for his or her leadership. Athletes, management, fans, and the media should 
take a more objective approach when judging the work of coaches rather than just 
following the spurious implications of the outcome–performance relationship. Thus, 
practitioners should provide these groups with means to judge their performance aptly, 
irrespective of results. 
 In general, it is hoped that the findings of this research and the broader literature 
that was proffered will spark a conversation among sport professionals about the role that 
outcomes play in performance evaluations. Indeed, outcomes have been shown to have 
drastic effects on people’s thoughts, cognitions, and actions; sport is likely no different. 
The ultimate aim in athletics is to increase the likelihood of success in the future. If we 
allow past outcomes to obfuscate this fact, we have failed to achieve this overarching 
goal and, worse yet, we have set athletes and coaches up for failure in the future.  
Although the impetus for the misguided raillery of the Seahawks’ final play call 
should now be clearer, the predominant question moving forward is whether or not actors 
in the sport domain will push to quell this untoward approach. Those who intend to heed 
this call should be cautioned that putative experts are liable to erroneously endorse a form 
of hindsight sophistry. Indeed, football minds, such as Emmitt Smith, used the result of 






Unfortunately, there is no indication that the sport intelligentsia will be disillusioned of 
their fascination with, and their specious confidence in, the implications of results any 
time soon, but it is hoped that a few visionaries will act as lodestars for greater 
objectivity.  
Our inability to ponder possibilities and reason probabilistically leads us to 
unjustly lambaste players, coaches, and organizations. The conjecturing that follows poor 
outcomes often plays a hand in the ultimate termination of the coaches, players, and 
management involved. Not just in sport, but also in a broad range of fields, outcomes 
have deleterious impacts. Indeed, shades of a bias run rampant in newspapers, history 
books, performance evaluations, et cetera. Highlighting our opacity, undue plaudits are 
granted to those who find success. What’s worse is our inexpert use of results leads us to 
wrongly condemn those who fail. Hard work notwithstanding, success is to some degree 
a product of chance–failure is too.  
In our jobs and other daily activities, our blind belief in fate has potent 
ramifications. Unwittingly and constantly, outcomes warp our view of the world around 
us. However, outcomes are not preordained and we cannot allow outcomes and the 
backfit narratives that accompany them to dictate our understanding of events. The 
environment we operate in is intractably complex and we must accept that the world is 
full of variability and volatility. The outcomes we receive and experience are not always 
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1This participant was deemed to be an outlier because their difference score 
between round 1 and round 2 exceeded 2.5 standard deviations for male participants (SD 
= 3.03). In round 1 this participant made 5 free throws and in round 2 they made 13 shots. 
This corresponds to a difference score of 8 made baskets which was 2.64 standard 
deviations beyond the mean 
2Using this abridged dataset, the other three hypotheses were tested through a 
series of t-tests. No statistically significant results were obtained and subsequent Cohen’s 
d tests yielded no effect sizes of note. 
3Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to determine if skill level was 
differentially impacted by outcomes. As was expected given the small samples, no 
significant differences were revealed. In light of these sample size concerns, a means 
table (Table 1) is provided.  
4For males only (i.e., the abridged dataset mentioned in footnote2), excluding the 
outlier (see footnote1), several different means on the basis of skill (i.e., highest level 
achieved) bear mention. Recreational players did not improve during round 2, but junior 
varsity players (MDiff = 0.6) improved by over half a shot and varsity athletes improved 
by nearly a full shot (MDiff = 0.82). As expected, varsity athletes made, on average, more 
shots (about 2 to 3 more shots) than junior varsity and recreational level athletes. Further, 
recreational and varsity level athletes rated their performance similarly following round 
1, while junior varsity athletes provided lower performance ratings. Finally, varsity 






Once again, because these figures represent mean scores only no casual inferences can be 
drawn. 
 
 
 
